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THE FALTERING PROMISE OF FDA TOBACCO REGULATION 
MICAH L. BERMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
Congress passed the Tobacco Control Act (TCA) in 2009, giving the FDA 
the authority to regulate tobacco products for the first time. Ten years later, the 
promise that the TCA’s enactment would be a transformative moment for public 
health has not materialized. To the contrary, the FDA’s most notable regulatory 
effort—requiring graphic warnings on cigarette packages and advertisements—
has been struck down in court, and the FDA is now scrambling to address a 
youth e-cigarette epidemic that caught it off guard. This Article provides a brief 
review of TCA implementation during the Obama administration, and it reviews 
the Trump administration’s “comprehensive plan” for nicotine regulation. It 
concludes with a discussion of the structural obstacles to more robust FDA 
tobacco regulation. 
  
 
* Associate Professor of Public Health and Law, The Ohio State University. Thanks to Rob Gattter 
and the participants at the 2018 St. Louis University Health Law Symposium on “Public Health in 
the Era of Alternative Facts, Isolationism, and the One Percent”; Lindsay Wiley, Marc Scheineson, 
and the participants at American University Washington College of Law’s “FDA: Past, Present, 
and Future” symposium; and my colleagues who participated in the Moritz College of Law junior 
faculty workshop and the Health Services Management and Policy works-in-progress series. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2009, Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act (TCA) with overwhelming bipartisan majorities,1 giving the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA), for the first time, comprehensive regulatory 
authority over tobacco products.2 At the signing ceremony, President Obama 
triumphantly declared, “Thanks to the work of Democrats and Republicans . . . 
the decades-long effort to protect our children from the harmful effects of 
tobacco has emerged victorious.”3  
Ten years later, the promise that the TCA’s enactment would be a 
transformative moment for public health has not been fulfilled. Smoking rates, 
for the most part, have continued their slight year-to-year declines, but 
implementation of the TCA has so far failed to impact this overall trend in any 
perceptible way.4 E-cigarette use among youth, which was essentially a non-
issue in 2009, has become an “epidemic” that threatens to produce “a whole 
generation of young people . . . addicted to nicotine.”5 The FDA’s most notable 
regulatory effort—requiring large, graphic warnings on cigarette packages and 
advertisements—was struck down in court on First Amendment grounds.6 And 
 
 1. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 
(2009). The Act was approved in the Senate by a 79-19 margin. H.R.1256 - Family Smoking 
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll 
_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1&vote=00207 (last visited Mar. 29, 
2019). The Act was approved by the House of Representatives by a 307-97 vote. Id. 
 2. The history leading up to the enactment of the TCA is beyond the scope of this paper. For 
a detailed review of the FDA’s unsuccessful first attempt to regulate tobacco products in the 1990s, 
see generally DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT 383–84 (2001). 
 3. Barack Obama, Remarks regarding the Signing of the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act (June 22, 2009) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives. 
gov/video/President-Obama-Signs-Kids-Tobacco-Legislation/#transcript). 
 4. See Ahmed Jamal et al., Current Cigarette Smoking Among Adults — United States, 2005–
2014, 64 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1233, 1233, 1235 (2015). 
 5. FDA Statement, FDA, Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on New 
Steps to Address Epidemic of Youth E-cigarette Use (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-
events/press-announcements/statement-fda-commissioner-scott-gottlieb-md-new-steps-address-
epidemic-youth-e-cigarette-use. Counting e-cigarette use as a form of tobacco use (as the FDA 
does), the rate of past-30-day tobacco use among high school students was higher in 2018 (at 
27.1%) than in any year since 2002. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 4.9 
Million Middle and High School Students Used Tobacco Products in 2018 (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2019/p0211-youth-tobacco-use-increased.html; René A. 
Arrazola et al., Patterns of Current Use of Tobacco Products Among US High School Students for 
2000–2012—Findings from the National Youth Tobacco Survey, 54 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 54, 
56 tbl.1 (2014). 
 6. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1208, 1222 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012). 
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policies within the FDA’s authority that could save tens of thousands of lives, 
such as prohibiting the sale of menthol cigarettes, have not been put in place.7  
What happened? Why has the TCA, at least to this point, failed to deliver on 
its promise? In search of answers, this Article reviews some of the key 
developments in the ten years the FDA has had regulatory authority over tobacco 
products. From the outset, there have been competing visions of what the TCA 
was designed to do and how it might be implemented. Tobacco companies 
expected that the law would essentially lock in the status quo and protect their 
market positions, while public health groups intended for the FDA to 
aggressively reshape the industry in order to sharply reduce smoking rates. It 
was impossible for these conflicting views to simultaneously be correct. Under 
the Obama administration, the tobacco industry’s view of how the law would 
function was far closer to the reality. And although the FDA under the Trump 
administration has proposed surprisingly strong tobacco control measures (such 
as reducing the level of nicotine in cigarettes), a combination of structural factors 
makes it unlikely that these measures will be implemented anytime soon. Part II 
of this Article reviews the competing perspectives of what the TCA was intended 
to accomplish. Part III describes how some key battles over the TCA’s 
implementation played out during the Obama administration. Part IV then 
describes the Trump administration’s “comprehensive plan” for nicotine 
regulation, its status to date, and its future prospects. The Article concludes with 
a brief discussion of the structural challenges that prevent the FDA from being 
a more aggressive tobacco control agency and calls for a renewed focus on 
progress at the state and local level.  
II.  COMPETING VISIONS OF THE TCA 
The TCA passed as a bipartisan, compromise bill, with support from all of 
the major public health and tobacco control groups (the Campaign for Tobacco-
Free Kids, the American Lung Association, the American Cancer Society, etc.) 
and from the nation’s largest tobacco company, Altria Group. This odd 
bedfellows partnership was possible because the two sides had very different 
visions of how the law would be implemented.8  
 
 7. The Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee—the body set up by the TCA to 
advise the FDA on tobacco-related matters—estimated in 2011 that a rule prohibiting the sale of 
menthol cigarettes would save more than 300,000 lives by the year 2050. TOBACCO PRODS. SCI. 
ADVISORY COMM., MENTHOL CIGARETTES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 205 tbl.1 (2011), https://wayback.archive-it.org/7993/20170 
405201750/https:/www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/ 
TobaccoProductsScientificAdvisoryCommittee/UCM247689.pdf. 
 8. See Michael Givel, Philip Morris’ FDA Gambit: Good for Public Health?, 26 J. PUB. 
HEALTH POL’Y 450 (2005) (analyzing earlier version of the TCA and discussing the interests of 
both the public health community and Philip Morris in pursing FDA regulation). 
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From the tobacco industry’s side, the law established that tobacco products, 
and cigarettes in particular, would be subject to regulation, but that they were 
here to stay as legitimate, regulated products. The purpose of the TCA, from the 
industry’s perspective, was to educate the public, prevent the introduction of 
new products that would harm public health more, and get rid of “bad actors” 
(e.g., those selling counterfeit cigarettes or allowing sales to minors)—but 
otherwise to let people make their own decisions about whether to smoke. 
Indeed, the law’s “purpose” section states that one goal of the TCA was to 
“continue to permit the sale of tobacco products to adults in conjunction with 
measures to ensure that they are not sold or accessible to underage 
purchasers[.]”9 This framing amounted to a congressional stamp of approval for 
two of the industry’s key talking points: that smoking is an “adult choice” and 
that the industry has no interest in selling to minors.10 
On a more practical level, the law also provided concrete advantages to the 
major tobacco companies.11 For one, the law’s “grandfathering” provision 
exempted products that were commercially available as of February 15, 2007 
from the Act’s premarket review requirements, but it required expensive and 
cumbersome marketing applications for products introduced after that date.12 
This naturally favored the companies that dominated the market as of 2007 and 
 
 9. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 3. 
 10. Edith D. Balbach et al., How the Health Belief Model Helps the Tobacco Industry: 
Individuals, Choice, and “Information”, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL iv37, iv38 (2006). (“The view 
presented by [tobacco industry] executives . . . is that the responsibility of cigarette manufacturers 
is simply to support the individuals’ right to choose to smoke and to offer them more choices among 
products. Moral agency is lodged only within individual consumers, who can choose to exercise 
those ‘rights’. If the consumer makes unfortunate choices, the industry and its products are not to 
blame.”). It is important to note that these two talking points are demonstrably false. The vast 
majority of current smokers started smoking as minors, not as adults, and the industry has a long 
history of marketing to youth. United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 
2006) (detailing industry practices of marketing to youth). 
 11. Due to post-TCA consolidation, there are two only two major tobacco companies that 
control roughly 90% of the U.S. cigarette market: Altria (which owns Philip Morris USA), and 
Reynolds American (which owns R.J. Reynolds). Reynolds American is in turn owned by British 
American Tobacco, one of the world’s largest international tobacco companies. In addition to the 
practical advantages provided by regulation, there is substantial evidence that Altria/Philip Morris 
supported FDA regulation in order to boost its public image. See Patricia A. McDaniel & Ruth E. 
Malone, Understanding Philip Morris’s Pursuit of US Government Regulation of Tobacco, 14 
TOBACCO CONTROL 193 (2005); Stanton A. Glantz et al., Compromise or Capitulation? US Food 
and Drug Administration Jurisdiction over Tobacco Products, PLOS MED., July 2009, at 1, 2; 
Reynolds, Altria Lead Smokers Toward Tobacco’s New Era, YAHOO! FIN.: INV’R’S BUS. DAILY 
(Aug. 1, 2014), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/reynolds-altria-lead-smokers-toward-2126004 
34.html; Leo Sun, A Foolish Take: Which Companies Control the U.S. Tobacco Market?, MOTLEY 
FOOL (May 9, 2017), https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/05/01/a-foolish-take-which-compa 
nies-control-the-us-toba.aspx. 
 12. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 910. 
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made it difficult for new rivals to emerge.13 Relatedly, large companies like 
Altria and Reynolds American can easily absorb substantial new compliance-
related costs (like the requirement to engage in product testing and report levels 
of “harmful and potentially harmful constituents”14), but smaller companies 
cannot. Again, this reinforced the incumbent advantage these companies already 
possessed. Finally, it is likely that Altria—perhaps with a wink to its more 
litigious rival, Reynolds American—thought that any aggressive moves by the 
FDA could be defeated either through the courts or by lobbying the 
administration or Congress.15 Indeed, immediately after the law was passed, R.J. 
Reynolds (and other tobacco companies and retailers) prevailed in a legal 
challenge that knocked out what would likely have been one of the TCA’s most 
effective measures—limits on the use of colors and graphics in advertising for 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco.16 This provision was invalidated on First 
Amendment grounds by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the FDA did 
not appeal to the Supreme Court.17  
Meanwhile, public health groups had a very different view of the law and 
what the FDA would do with its newfound authority. When the law was signed 
by President Obama, the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids called it a “historic 
blow against the greatest public health menace of our time,” and said, “[w]e look 
forward to the FDA effectively implementing this law and using the strong 
authority it has been given to fundamentally change how tobacco products are 
manufactured, marketed and sold in the United States.”18 Indeed, the law did 
grant the FDA tremendous regulatory powers, including the ability to: 
• Set “product standards” to reduce the addictiveness, toxicity, or appeal of 
tobacco products (including, for example, by reducing nicotine levels or 
prohibiting the use of certain flavors)19; 
 
 13. See Lawrence O. Gostin, FDA Regulation of Tobacco: Politics, Law, and the Public’s 
Health, 302 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1459, 1460 (2009) (noting that “the [TCA] is a way of solidifying 
Altria’s market dominance, with regulatory hurdles dampening competition, particularly the 
introduction of ‘safer’ cigarettes.”). 
 14. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 914. 
 15. See Letter from Michael E. Szymanczyk, Chairman & CEO, Altria Group, Inc. to the 
President of the United States (June 12, 2009) (on file with author) (stating that Altria supported 
the Tobacco Control Act, but noting that it opposed some provisions, “including those that we 
believe cross constitutional limits”). 
 16. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 518, 569 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 17. Id. at 518; Am. Snuff Co., LLC v. U.S., 569 U.S. 946, 946 (2013) (showing that the 
tobacco companies appealed other elements of the case to the Supreme Court, but their petition for 
review was denied). 
 18. Press Release, Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, President Obama Delivers Historic 
Victory for America’s Kids and Health Over Tobacco (June 23, 2009), https://www.tobaccofree 
kids.org/press-releases/id_1161 (emphasis added). 
 19. Product standards apply even to “grandfathered” products that were available as of 
February 15, 2007. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 907.  
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• Require larger, graphic warning labels on cigarette products and 
advertisements; 
• Restrict the sales, advertising, or promotion of tobacco products “to [the] 
full extent permitted by the [F]irst [A]mendment”; 
• Conduct premarket review any new tobacco products to ensure that they 
are “substantially equivalent” to grandfathered products (those on the 
market as of February 15, 2007) or that their sale would be “appropriate 
for the protection of the public health”; 
• Prohibit health-related (“modified risk”) claims that have not been 
reviewed and authorized by the FDA; and 
• Engage in public health education, including efforts to prevent youth 
tobacco use.20 
Public health groups reasoned that even if the FDA was not able to take full 
advantage of these powers due to tobacco industry interference or other political 
pressures, FDA regulation would still be, on balance, a vast improvement over 
the unregulated status quo.21 
III.  THE OBAMA YEARS 
During the Obama administration, it appeared that the tobacco industry had 
the more accurate assessment of how the TCA would play out in practice. The 
FDA implemented the mandatory provisions put in the place by the TCA, but, 
with the exception of the Deeming Rule (discussed below), the FDA engaged in 
no discretionary rulemaking to further the TCA’s goals. Not one product 
standard was issued during the Obama administration, and, apart from the 
Deeming Rule and the TCA’s mandatory provisions, not one restriction on the 
sales, promotion, or marketing of tobacco products was put in place. Moreover, 
FDA’s implementation of its premarket review authorities was deeply flawed, 
and, at least in some cases, ignored entirely by the industry without any 
consequences.22  
 
 20. Id. §§ 3, 201, 906, 907, 910, 911. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Among other 
provisions, the TCA also prohibited sales to minors, limited tobacco marketing, and prohibited 
flavored cigarettes (with the exception of menthol and tobacco flavors). See id. §§ 103, 907, 910. 
As discussed below, the TCA originally limited the FDA’s regulatory authority to cigarettes, 
smokeless tobacco, and roll-your-own tobacco, but it authorized the FDA to extend its authority to 
other products meeting the statutory definition of a “tobacco product” through administrative 
rulemaking. Id. § 901. 
 21. Some within the public health community were more skeptical. See, e.g., Glantz et al., 
supra note 11, at 1. 
 22. See generally Desmond Jenson et al., FDA’s Misplaced Priorities: Premarket Review 
under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 25 TOBACCO CONTROL 246 
(2016). 
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A few brief case studies will illustrate how some key issues played out 
during the Obama administration. 
A. Menthol 
Menthol is a mint-derived additive that reduces the harshness of cigarette 
smoking. Menthol cigarettes increase youth initiation of smoking, deepen 
nicotine dependence, and inhibit smoking cessation.23 “Menthol also has a 
disproportionate impact on vulnerable populations including youth, African 
Americans, Hispanics, the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) 
community, Asian-Americans, and women.”24 The TCA prohibited the sale of 
cigarettes with “characterizing flavor[s],” but included an exception for menthol 
flavored-cigarettes. The TCA, however, gave the FDA the authority to limit or 
prohibit the use of menthol in cigarettes, and it instructed the FDA’s tobacco 
advisory committee, the Tobacco Products Scientific Advisory Committee 
(TPSAC), to take up the issue of menthol regulation as its first item of 
business.25 In March 2011, TPSAC approved an extensive 249-page review of 
the evidence on the topic, concluding that “[r]emoval of menthol cigarettes from 
the marketplace would benefit public health in the United States.”26 Before the 
report was even issued, however, Lorillard Tobacco Company and R.J. 
Reynolds filed a lawsuit in federal court asserting that several members of 
TPSAC should have been disqualified from TPSAC participation for serving as 
expert witnesses against tobacco companies, consulting for pharmaceutical 
companies, or possessing “pre-existing, well-defined anti-tobacco stances”—
and that the FDA should therefore be barred from relying on TPSAC’s menthol 
report.27 The FDA responded by dismissing the complained-about members 
from TPSAC,28 even though the FDA ultimately prevailed in the litigation.29 
The FDA then decided to conduct its own review of the science surrounding 
menthol (perhaps out of concern that a court would block it from relying on 
TPSAC’s menthol report). Though this review did not make as direct a policy 
recommendation, it too concluded that “adequate data suggest that menthol use 
 
 23. Andrea C. Villanti et al., Menthol Cigarettes and the Public Health Standard: A Systematic 
Review, 18 BMC PUB. HEALTH 983 (2017). 
 24. Joelle M. Lester & Stacey Younger Gagosian, Finished with Menthol: An Evidence-Based 
Policy Option That Will Save Lives, 45 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 41, 41 (Supp. I 2017). 
 25. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §§ 3, 907. 
 26. TOBACCO PRODS. SCI. ADVISORY COMM., supra note 7, at 225. 
 27. Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 58, 124, Lorillard, Inc. 
v. Food & Drug Admin., No. 1:110cv000440 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2013). 
 28. Statement from Mitch Zeller, FDA (Mar. 5, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/2015030 
8205058/http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/NewsEvents/ucm436783.htm. 
 29. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 810 F.3d 827, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 
(holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and thus, the court did not address the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ claims). 
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is likely associated with increased smoking initiation by youth and young 
adults,” that “menthol in cigarettes is likely associated with greater addiction,” 
and that “it [is] likely that menthol cigarettes pose a public health risk above that 
seen with nonmenthol cigarettes.”30 Instead of initiating regulatory action, 
however, the FDA then took the further step of sending out its analysis for peer 
review. The public health community started to grumble that the FDA was 
dragging its feet. In 2013, when the FDA still had not taken any action, several 
public health groups filed a citizen petition asking the FDA to “prohibit menthol 
as a characterizing flavor in cigarettes.”31  
The FDA’s response to the Citizen Petition consisted of a three-part 
announcement: (1) it issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPRM), stating that it was considering regulatory options regarding menthol 
in cigarettes and inviting public comments; (2) it announced that it would fund 
additional research on menthol in cigarettes; and (3) it stated that it was 
developing a public education campaign “focused on preventing and reducing 
tobacco use, including menthol cigarettes.”32 The ANPRM garnered more than 
174,000 comments, but during the remaining three years of the Obama 
administration, the FDA took no further action to address the issue of menthol 
in cigarettes.  
B. Graphic Health Warnings 
The TCA instructed the FDA to require new, graphic warnings for cigarette 
packages and advertisements that would cover the top 50% of the front and rear 
panels of cigarette packages and the top 20% of cigarette advertisements.33 
Extensive research has demonstrated that such graphic warnings “increase 
knowledge about tobacco use harms and perceptions of risk and promote 
smoking cessation.”34 Accordingly, such warnings are standard practice 
 
 30. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC EVALUATION OF THE POSSIBLE 
PUBLIC HEALTH EFFECTS OF MENTHOL VERSUS NONMENTHOL CIGARETTES 6 (2013). 
 31. See generally TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM ET AL., CITIZEN PETITION: 
ASKING THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION TO PROHIBIT MENTHOL AS A 
CHARACTERIZING FLAVOR IN CIGARETTES (2013). 
 32. News Release, FDA, FDA Invites Public Input on Menthol in Cigarettes (July 23, 2013), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20130725191928/http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/Press
Announcements/ucm361966.htm. 
 33. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 201. 
 34. CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOBACCO HEALTH WARNINGS: EVIDENCE OF 
EFFECTIVENESS 2 (2018). 
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internationally,35 but in the U.S., cigarette packages still have the small, text-
only warnings that have been on the side of cigarette packages since 1965.36 
The TCA gave the FDA two years to issue a regulation proposing new 
warnings. Two years to the day after the TCA’s enactment (June 22, 2011), the 
FDA did so, proposing nine images to pair with the nine textual warnings 
outlined in the statute. Eight of those images are shown in Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1: FDA PROPOSED WARNING IMAGES37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rule was immediately challenged in federal court by R.J. Reynolds and 
joined by other tobacco companies, which asserted that the rule violated the 
companies’ First Amendment rights.38  
The tobacco companies ultimately prevailed on the First Amendment 
challenge, with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
concluding in a two-to-one ruling that the images were improper because they 
were “primarily intended to evoke an emotional response” rather than to inform 
consumers.39 The court further wrote that the FDA had failed to show the 
 
 35. CANADIAN CANCER SOC’Y, CIGARETTE PACKAGE HEALTH WARNINGS: INTERNATIONAL 
STATUS REPORT 2, 6 (5th ed. 2016). 
 36. See Ellen Peters et al., Emotion in the Law and the Lab: The Case of Graphic Cigarette 
Warnings, 2 TOBACCO REG. SCI. 404, 405 (2016) (“The text of the warnings has changed 
somewhat over time whereas their size and placement have remained similar for more than 50 
years.” The FDA has also acknowledged that the current warnings are “‘invisible’ and fail to 
convey relevant information in an effective way.”). See also Required Warnings for Cigarette 
Packages and Advertisements, 75 Fed. Reg. 69.524, 69.525 (Nov. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1141). 
 37. FDA, https://www.fda.gov/. 
 38. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food & Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1211 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 39. Id. at 1216, 1222. Earlier, the tobacco industry had challenged, on First Amendment 
grounds, the portion of the TCA that required graphic warnings. This challenge was rejected by the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. U.S., 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th 
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, Am. Snuff Co., LLC. v. United States, 569 U.S. 946 (2013) (“Because 
graphics can present factual information regarding the health risks of using tobacco, and because 
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warnings would further the government’s interest in reducing smoking, because 
it “offer[ed] no evidence showing that such warnings have directly caused a 
material decrease in smoking rates in any of the countries that now require 
them.”40  
With respect to the latter point, the FDA’s loss may have been partially self-
inflicted. The court repeatedly cited the FDA’s own regulatory impact analysis 
(RIA), which estimated that the rule would reduce the U.S. smoking rate by only 
0.088%, a number that was “not statistically distinguishable from zero.”41 The 
conclusions of this RIA have been extensively critiqued and undermined by 
subsequent scholarship. The RIA relied on analysis of the effects of graphic 
warning labels (GWLs) in Canada, but leading scholars have demonstrated that 
“GWLs adopted in Canada decreased adult smoking prevalence by 12–20%, 33–
53 times larger than FDA’s estimates.”42  
The court’s conclusions were troubling, and its loose grip on both 
psychology43 and epidemiology44 have been appropriately criticized 
elsewhere—but the decision invalidated only the specific images the FDA had 
proposed, not the underlying requirement for the FDA to implement graphic 
warnings for cigarettes. In March 2013, following the court’s decision, the FDA 
decided not to appeal the case to the Supreme Court. Instead, the FDA stated 
that it would “undertake [new] research to support a new rulemaking.”45 Though 
the FDA has subsequently funded a considerable amount of research relating to 
graphic warnings, it still has not initiated any formal steps to start a new 
rulemaking process. Several major public health groups lost patience in October 
2016 and filed a lawsuit against the FDA, arguing the FDA had “unlawfully 
withheld and unreasonably delayed action on a rule” required by the TCA and 
 
this information alleviates the possibility of consumer confusion, the Act’s graphic-warning 
requirement is constitutional. . . .”). Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling on the as-applied 
challenge to the FDA’s regulation nullified the FDA’s warning requirement. 
 40. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219 (emphasis added). 
 41. Id. at 1220. 
 42. Jidong Huang et al., Cigarette Graphic Warning Labels and Smoking Prevalence in 
Canada: A Critical Examination and Reformulation of the FDA Regulatory Impact Analysis, 
TOBACCO CONTROL, Mar. 2014 at 4 (emphasis added) (“[O]ur estimates imply that if similar 
[graphic warning labels] had been implemented in the USA in 2012, this would have led to a 
reduction of 5.3–8.6 million adult smokers in the USA in 2013.”). 
 43. Peters et al., supra note 36, at 409 (“The courts in the R.J. Reynolds case . . . in trying to 
distinguish between ‘factual’ and ‘emotional’ messages, applied a simplistic model of the human 
mind and how it processes information that is out of sync with current behavioral research.”). 
 44. Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, The Courts and Public Health: Caught in a Pincer 
Movement, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 394 (2014) (“The majority’s disdain for the FDA’s 
evidence shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the science behind epidemiology.”). 
 45. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen., to John Boehner, Speaker of the House (Mar. 15, 
2013), https://tobacco.ucsf.edu/sites/tobacco.ucsf.edu/files/u9/Ltr%20to%20Speaker%20re%20 
Reynolds%20v%20FDA.PDF. 
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asking the court to order the FDA to issue a new rule.46 In March 2019, the 
district court judge ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, ordering the FDA to complete 
a new rulemaking by March 2020.47 Even if the FDA meets that deadline, 
however, it is likely to give the tobacco companies eighteen months (until 
November 2021) to comply with the new warning requirements, and the industry 
is certain to challenge any new mandate in court, likely causing further delays. 
Additionally, the general legal landscape for mandated warnings has only 
become more challenging for the FDA in the meantime, and thus the FDA’s 
prospects for success in another legal battle are uncertain.48  
C. The Deeming Rule 
The TCA gave the FDA immediate authority over cigarettes, cigarette 
tobacco, smokeless tobacco, and roll-your-own tobacco. However, it also 
authorized the agency to regulate “any other tobacco products that the Secretary 
by regulation deems” subject to its jurisdiction.49 
Around the time the TCA was passed, the FDA started to realize that e-
cigarettes (which are not mentioned in the text of the TCA at all) raised potential 
public health concerns. In 2009, it tried to bar certain e-cigarettes from being 
imported into the country, claiming that they were “unapproved drug-device 
combinations.”50 E-cigarette manufacturers challenged this action in court, 
arguing that their products should instead be regulated as tobacco products under 
the newly-enacted TCA because they contained nicotine derived from tobacco. 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with this argument and told the FDA 
that e-cigarettes could only be regulated as tobacco products, provided they were 
 
 46. Complaint at 25, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. United States Food & Drug Admin., 330 F. 
Supp. 3d. 367 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-11985-IT). 
 47. Memorandum & Order Granting Injunctive Relief at 6, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Food 
& Drug Admin., 330 F. Supp. 3d 657 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 1:16-cv-11985-IT), 2019 WL 1047149, 
at *3. 
 48. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet et al., The Supreme Court’s Crisis Pregnancy Center Case—
Implications for Health Law, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1489, 1490 (2018) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s 2018 decision in National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra and 
predicting that “NIFLA may . . . threaten a wide range of commercial-disclosure requirements and 
warning laws, despite the Court’s assurances to the contrary.”). Citing the NIFLA decision, a federal 
district court judge later enjoined implementation of the FDA’s planned textual warnings for cigars. 
Cigar Ass’n v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 317 F. Supp. 3d 555, 558 (D.D.C. 2018). 
 49. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act § 901. 
 50. Sottera, Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 627 F.3d 891, at 893, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The 
FDA claimed these products were unapproved drug-delivery devices because it appeared that they 
were being sold for the purpose of helping to treat the withdrawal symptoms of nicotine addiction. 
The FDA argued that the products needed go through the drug approval process before they could 
be legally marketed. Id. 
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not making therapeutic claims (which would lead them to be classified as drugs 
or drug-delivery devices).51  
In 2011, the FDA announced that it would not appeal the court’s decision to 
the Supreme Court and would instead issue a “Deeming Rule” to bring e-
cigarettes under its TCA-based regulatory authority.52 But while the public 
health community waited for the FDA to follow through on this pledge, e-
cigarette use, particularly, among youth, skyrocketed. Current e-cigarette use 
(defined as use within the past thirty days) by high school students increased 
from 1.5% in 2011 to 16% in 2015, a more than 900% increase.53 Youth use of 
e-cigarettes is particularly concerning because of nicotine’s ability to induce 
structural changes in the brain that enhance the risk of deep, long-lasting nicotine 
addiction.54 Additionally, “[o]ther consequences of early nicotine exposure 
include changes to the developing limbic system (the emotional core of the 
brain), which increases the likelihood of developing mood disorders, attention 
and cognition disorders, and drug-seeking behaviors.”55 In 2013, forty attorneys 
general joined in asking the FDA to move quickly to regulate e-cigarettes, noting 
that “e-cigarettes are being marketed to children through cartoon-like 
advertising characters and by offering fruit and candy flavors, much like 
cigarettes were once marketed to hook new smokers.”56 Beyond marketing to 
youth, other problems resulting from the lack of regulation included a lack of 
basic quality control;57 counterfeit, mislabeled, and contaminated products;58 
use of potentially dangerous flavorants and additives;59 and false and misleading 
 
 51. Id. at 898-99 (“The FDA has authority to regulate customarily marketed tobacco 
products—including e-cigarettes—under the [Tobacco Control Act]. It has authority to regulate 
therapeutically marketed tobacco products under the FDCA’s drug/device provisions.”). 
 52. Joyce Frieden, FDA Will Regulate E-Cigarettes as Tobacco, MEDPAGE TODAY (Apr. 26, 
2011), https://www.medpagetoday.com/Washington-Watch/FDAGeneral/26131. 
 53. See AHMED JAMAL ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, TOBACCO USE 
AMONG MIDDLE AND HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS — UNITED STATES, 2011–2016 2 (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/wr/mm6623a1.htm. 
 54. Patricia J. Zettler et al., Closing the Regulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine Products, 59 
B.C.L. REV. 1934, 1949 (2018). 
 55. Id. at 1941. 
 56. Regulate E-Cigarettes Like Tobacco Products, 40 Attorneys General Urge FDA, CBS 
NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/regulate-e-cigarettes-like-tobacco-prod 
ucts-40-attorneys-general-urge-fda/. 
 57. Nathan K. Cobb et al., Novel Nicotine Delivery Systems and Public Health: The Rise of 
the “E-Cigarette”, 100 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2340, 2341 (2010). 
 58. Esther E. Omaiye et al., Counterfeit Electronic Cigarette Products with Mislabeled 
Nicotine Concentrations, 3 TOBACCO REG. SCI. 347, 353 (2017). 
 59. Raquel Rutledge, Lab Tests Reveal Popular E-Cigarette Liquids Contain Harmful 
Chemicals, J. SENTINEL (Oct. 20, 2015), http://archive.jsonline.com/watchdog/watchdogreports/ 
lab-tests-reveal-popular-e-cigarette-liquids-contain-harmful-chemicals-b99583582z1-3348339 
61.html/. 
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claims.60 Indeed, knowing that potentially onerous FDA regulation was on its 
way quite plausibly led some e-cigarette companies to try to make as much 
money as possible in a short period of time, without regard to product safety.61  
In 2014, the FDA finally issued a proposed Deeming Rule.62 After receiving 
and reviewing more than 135,000 comments, it issued a final rule that took effect 
on August 8, 2016, deeming itself to have regulatory authority over all “products 
meeting the [TCA’s] statutory definition of ‘tobacco product.’”63  
The Deeming Rule extended the FDA’s tobacco-related jurisdiction not only 
to e-cigarettes, but also to cigars, cigarillos, pipe tobacco, hookah tobacco, and 
other previously unregulated tobacco products. Among other provisions, the 
Deeming Rule (1) prohibited sales of the newly-deemed products to minors, (2) 
mandated text-only warning labels, and (3) applied the TCA’s general regulatory 
framework to the newly-deemed products, including requirements relating to 
premarket review and pre-approval of modified risk claims.64 Industry 
associations and individual businesses filed at least a dozen lawsuits challenging 
various aspects of the Deeming Rule; as of March 2019, several of those lawsuits 
remain pending.65 
The public health community generally welcomed the finalization of the 
Deeming Rule, but because the rule had been so extensively delayed, it had a bit 
of a “closing the stable door after the horse has bolted” feel to it.66 Because the 
newly-deemed products were subject to the same regulatory structure as 
cigarettes and smokeless tobacco, finalization of the rule meant that any product 
introduced after February 15, 2007 was required to retroactively go through the 
premarket review process. The FDA recognized that it would be unfair and 
impractical to remove all of the thousands of newly-deemed products from the 
 
 60. Elizabeth G. Klein et al., Online E-cigarette Marketing Claims: A Systematic Content and 
Legal Analysis, 2 TOBACCO REG. SCI. 252, 259 (2016). 
 61. This could help explain the problem of exploding e-cigarettes. See, e.g., Susan F. Rudy & 
Elizabeth L. Durmowicz, Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems: Overheating, Fires and 
Explosions, 26 TOBACCO CONTROL 10, 14 (2017). 
 62. Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to FDCA, 79 Fed. Reg. 23,142, 23,142–43 (Apr. 
25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R pt. 1100, 1140, 1143). 
 63. See generally 81 Fed. Reg. 28,973, 28,974–29,020 (May 10, 2016) (to be codified at 21 
C.F.R pt. 1100, 1140, 1143). 
 64. Id. 
 65. For a list on ongoing lawsuits, see Lawsuits Challenging the FDA’s Deeming Rule (2019), 
PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., https://publichealthlawcenter.org/resources/lawsuits-challenging-fda-deem 
ing-rule (last updated Mar. 5, 2019). 
 66. See, e.g., Lawrence Gostin, The FDA’s E-Cigarette Rule Isn’t Enough, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (May 6, 2016), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-05-06/curbing-e-ciga 
rettes-and-tobacco-use-would-be-obamas-real-moonshot (“. . .At long last, the Food and Drug 
Administration finalized its ‘deeming’ rule, putting cigars, pipe tobacco, hookah, e-cigarettes and 
other nondrug nicotine products under FDA’s extensive tobacco control authority. But it is too little 
and too late.”). 
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marketplace while they underwent premarket review.67 It therefore stated that 
products that had been introduced after February 15, 2007, but before the 
Deeming Rule was finalized, could stay on the market until they submitted such 
applications (which they were required to do within two years) and for another 
year thereafter—up to three years in total.68 But because of Deeming Rule was 
not finalized until 2016, this provision—as well as most of the rest of the 
Deeming Rule’s requirements—was left for the Trump administration to 
implement. 
For tobacco control advocates, the Obama years began with the excitement 
of the TCA’s passage and ended largely in disappointment. This section 
reviewed only a few of the key issues the FDA considered during this period, 
but the pattern is clear. Any significant FDA action (or even potential action) 
was met with litigation. And while the market continued to rapidly evolve, the 
FDA moved forward—if at all—at an exceedingly slow pace, adding 
unnecessary procedural steps to its deliberative processes, and at times 
producing questionable analyses that undermined its own litigation position.69 
IV.  THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND THE FUTURE 
When the Trump administration came into office, there was reason for 
public health advocates to be concerned about the future direction of FDA 
tobacco regulation.70 But Scott Gottlieb, appointed by President Trump as FDA 
 
 67. It would have been unfair, because the companies had no ability to submit a premarket 
review application before the Deeming Rule was finalized and thus would have had no ability to 
keep their products from being removed from the market even if they could meet the applicable 
standards. 
 68. 81 Fed. Reg. 28,973, 28,978. Smaller e-cigarette manufacturers and retailers complained 
that this premarket review requirement would, when fully implemented, put them out of business 
because they could not afford the expense of submitting premarket review applications. Andrew 
Siddons, E-Cigarette Regulations Could Stymie Small Shops, ROLL CALL (May 5, 2016), 
https://www.rollcall.com/news/policy/fda-issues-long-awaited-e-cigarette-regulations (quoting 
Gregory Conley, president of the American Vaping Association, as saying, “If the FDA’s rule is 
not changed by Congress or the courts, thousands of small businesses will close in two to three 
years.”). 
 69. For discussion of another example of questionable FDA analysis, see Frank J. Chaloupka 
et al., Accounting for “Lost Pleasure” in a Cost–Benefit Analysis of Government Regulation: The 
Case of the Food and Drug Administration’s Proposed Cigarette Labeling Regulation, 162 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 64, 65 (2015). 
 70. Among other reasons, President Trump had previously partnered with Philip Morris to 
promote cigarettes at his casino. Adam Shapiro, Trump’s Taj Mahal Tobacco Proposal Shows His 
Willingness to Put Profit over People, NBC NEWS (July 6, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think 
/opinion/trump-s-taj-mahal-tobacco-proposal-shows-his-willingness-put-ncna889121. He had also 
invested in tobacco companies, “including Philip Morris International, its American spinoff Altria 
Group, and Reynolds American Inc.” Jessica Glenza, Tobacco Companies Tighten Hold on 
Washington Under Trump, GUARDIAN (July 13, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2017/jul/13/tobacco-industry-trump-administration-ties. And for Secretary of Health and Human 
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Commissioner, immediately took a personal interest in tobacco regulation and 
proposed surprisingly aggressive regulatory action. On July 28, 2017, 
Commissioner Gottlieb announced that the FDA was pursuing a 
“Comprehensive Plan for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation,” including 
exploring the potentially game-changing option of reducing nicotine levels in 
cigarettes to non-addictive levels.71 
A. The FDA’s “Comprehensive Plan for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation” 
The FDA’s July 2017 announcement included three components.72 The 
first—and the one that drew the lion’s share of press attention—was its plan to 
consider lowering nicotine levels in cigarettes (and, potentially, other tobacco 
products) to “minimally-addictive or non-addictive levels.” If the FDA 
eventually implements such a regulation, it could have a transformative public 
health impact. It is no exaggeration to say that the tobacco industry’s entire 
business model is built around the addictiveness of cigarettes (and, in once-
secret internal documents, the industry has admitted as much).73 Young kids, 
who believe they will not become addicted to cigarettes, experiment with 
smoking, and then a significant portion of them ultimately become addicted, 
long-term cigarette smokers. If cigarettes were not addictive, the business model 
of recruiting young “replacement smokers” would fall apart.74 Modeling by 
FDA researchers suggests that if cigarettes were made non-addictive, the 
smoking rate would fall from roughly 15% today to 2% by 2040, as the next 
generation escapes the trap of addiction to cigarettes.75  
 
Services (the cabinet official to whom the FDA Commissioner reports), President Trump appointed 
Tom Price, a well-established ally of the tobacco industry. Patrick Caldwell, Of Course Trump’s 
Health Secretary Is a Friend of Big Tobacco, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.mother 
jones.com/politics/2017/02/tom-price-hhs-tobacco/ (noting Price’s history of investing in tobacco 
companies and receiving tobacco industry political contributions). Price has since left the 
administration. 
 71. FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of Tobacco-Related 
Disease, Death, FDA (July 28, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/newsevents/newsroom/pressannounce 
ments/ucm568923.htm. 
 72. For collected documents outlining the various components of this comprehensive plan, see 
FDA’s Comprehensive Plan for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/to 
baccoproducts/newsevents/ucm568425.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2018). 
 73. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 1, 562 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(“In internal documents, Defendants admit that stimulating youth smoking initiation and retaining 
and increasing their share of the youth market is crucial to the success of their businesses.”). 
 74. Philip Morris, F.Supp.2d, at 562, 565 (“The only way Defendants can sustain themselves 
is by bringing in large numbers of replacement smokers each year.”). 
 75. Benjamin J. Apelberg et al., Potential Public Health Effects of Reducing Nicotine Levels 
in Cigarettes in the United States, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1725, 1725, 1727–30 (2018). This 
estimate is based on an “expert elicitation” of the likely effects of nicotine reduction on smoking 
cessation, initiation, and dual use. Expert elicitation is helpful to demonstrate the possible impact 
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The second prong of the FDA’s plan was to “encourage innovations” by 
“extend[ing] timelines to submit tobacco product review applications for newly 
regulated tobacco products that were on the market as of August 8, 2016.”76 This 
delay was framed as a way to ensure that if the FDA reduces nicotine levels in 
cigarettes, there will be other, less harmful nicotine-delivery alternatives 
available to current smokers. In theory, this approach makes sense. As 
Commissioner Gottlieb emphasized in his announcement, nicotine makes 
cigarettes addictive, but it is the byproducts of combustion that make them 
deadly.77 If current smokers could fully transition to non-combustible nicotine 
delivery products, including e-cigarettes, that could be a huge win for public 
health. But this prong of the “comprehensive plan” was problematic from the 
start for two reasons. First, the FDA delayed until 2021 the requirement to 
submit premarket review applications for newly-deemed combustible tobacco 
products, including cigars, pipe tobacco, and hookah tobacco. Delaying review 
of these products is wholly contrary to the goal of moving current smokers to 
less harmful products. Second, it delayed until 2022 the requirement to submit 
premarket review applications for newly-deemed non-combustible products, 
including e-cigarettes, but only for products that were on the market as of August 
8, 2016 (the effective date of the Deeming Rule).78 By definition, delaying 
review of products that are already being sold does nothing to promote 
innovation.79 Other steps—like providing for expedited premarket review of e-
 
of a nicotine reduction policy in general terms, but the specifics of the model output cannot be 
viewed as reliable. 
 76. FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of Tobacco-Related 
Disease, supra note 71. 
 77. Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, Food & Drug Admin., Protecting American Families: 
Comprehensive Approach to Nicotine and Tobacco (July 28, 2017). 
 78. Unlike the Deeming Rule, the revised guidance did not provide an end date by which these 
products would be removed from the market if not authorized for sale by the FDA. This provided 
an incentive for companies to avoid submitting their premarket review applications until the last 
possible date. 
 79. In September 2018, Commissioner Gottlieb stated that, given the evidence of surging e-
cigarette use, the FDA would “re-visit the compliance policy that we announced last summer to 
extend the application compliance periods for certain deemed products, including and especially 
the e-cigarettes that were on the market as of Aug. 8, 2016.” Press Release, Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r, 
FDA, New Steps to Address Epidemic of Youth E-cigarette Use (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm620185.htm. In doing so, 
the Commissioner suggested that the deadline for premarket review had been extended in 2017 
because “we wanted to allow time for FDA to establish and more clearly explain the series of 
appropriate regulatory gates ‒ and for companies to prepare quality applications for new products 
like e-cigarettes” in order to ensure that “there was a clear, viable pathway to seek FDA 
authorization to market alternative products for adult smokers who still sought access to nicotine.” 
Id. This statement altered the FDA’s previous explanation for the delayed implementation date. It 
suggested that the delayed enforcement was not due to a desire to “encourage innovation,” but was 
instead due to the FDA’s failure to adequately prepare itself and e-cigarette companies for the 
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cigarette products that meet certain criteria, as others have suggested,80 might 
have been more logical ways to promote innovation.81 
As the final prong of the plan, the FDA announced that it would seek public 
comment on three issues to “help ensure the agency has the proper science-based 
policies in place to meaningfully reduce the harms caused by tobacco use.”82 
The three topics were: (1) regulation of flavors—including menthol—in tobacco 
products; (2) regulation of “premium” cigars; and (3) increasing access to 
medicinal nicotine (such as gums and patches).83 As noted above, if nicotine 
levels are reduced in cigarettes, then it is important that current smokers have 
access to other, safer forms of nicotine. Accordingly, increasing access to 
medicinal nicotine, and potentially reformulating the products to make them 
more effective, is important.84 The other two points, however, can hardly be 
considered part of a true “comprehensive plan.” The FDA had already studied 
these issues in depth, and the FDA’s new call for comments only provided an 
opportunity to the opposing sides to revise and resubmit comments they 
submitted numerous times before. As discussed above, the FDA already has all 
the information it needs to take action on menthol. The new announcement 
extended the FDA’s track record of finding additional ways to study the issue 
 
Deeming Rule’s implementation. Given the fact that the Deeming Rule had been in the works for 
roughly six years before it was finalized, this is an astounding admission. 
 80. Eric N. Lindblom, Effectively Regulating E-Cigarettes and Their Advertising—And the 
First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 55, 79 (2015). 
 81. In March 2018, a coalition of public health groups filed a lawsuit against the FDA, 
claiming the delay in enforcing the Deeming Rule’s premarket review requirement was unlawful. 
That litigation is pending as of this writing. Laurie McGinley, FDA Sued for Delaying E-Cigarette, 
Cigar Regulations, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-
health/wp/2018/03/27/fda-sued-for-delaying-e-cigarette-cigar-regulations/?utm_term=.ba2e7abc 
419f. 
 82. FDA Announces Comprehensive Regulatory Plan to Shift Trajectory of Tobacco-Related 
Disease, supra note 71. 
 83. Id. Though not mentioned in its announcement, the FDA also opened a docket to 
“stimulate dialogue around the subject of possible illicit trade in connection with tobacco product 
standards.” Draft Concept Paper: Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products After Implementation of a Food 
and Drug Administration Product Standard; Availability; Request for Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 
11,754, 11,754 (Mar. 16, 2018). This feeds into one of the tobacco companies’ key talking points 
against any proposed nicotine standard. Andrew Rowell et al., Tobacco Industry Manipulation of 
Data on and Press Coverage of the Illicit Tobacco Trade in the UK, 23 TOBACCO CONTROL, May 
2014, at e35, e35 (“Despite historical involvement in the illicit trade, and recent evidence of 
complicity, [tobacco companies] continue to use the threat of illicit tobacco to argue against key 
tobacco control policies.”). 
 84. With regard to increasing access to medicinal nicotine products, this is something public 
health groups have been calling upon the FDA to do for years and is something the FDA has already 
studied and reported upon. See, e.g., Nicotine-Containing Products, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/For 
Consumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm345928.htm (last visited Oct. 7, 2018) (reporting on FDA’s 
TCA-mandated report to Congress on increasing access to medicinal nicotine and its response to a 
citizen petition from public health groups on the same topic). 
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without taking action. Likewise, the FDA had already sought input on both 
flavored products and premium cigars.85 With respect to premium cigars, the 
additional request for comments seems to have been a way to deflect some 
pressure from Congress to reconsider its decision (during the Obama 
administration) to include such products within the Deeming Rule.86  
After the explosive popularity of JUUL e-cigarettes led youth e-cigarette use 
to spike yet again in 2018—prompting Commissioner Gottlieb to refer to use e-
cigarette use as an “epidemic”87—the FDA added additional prong entitled 
“Youth Tobacco Prevention Plan,” which was absent from the its original plan.88 
The FDA has now also proposed (but not yet finalized) guidance to restrict the 
sale of flavored e-cigarettes and move the premarket review date for e-cigarettes 
back to 2021.89  
B. The Future 
The future of the FDA’s tobacco-related plans were thrown into question in 
March 2019, when Commissioner Gottlieb announced that he was leaving the 
FDA.90 Though his acting replacement, Ned Sharpless, has voiced support for 
continuing to pursue the same approach, it is unknown how actively or quickly 
he will be able to move it forward—or how long he will even be in that position.  
 
 85. FDA’s Early Steps Under New Tobacco Regulatory Framework: Seeking Input, Shaping 
Policy, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/News Events/ucm607551.htm#1 (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2018). Public comments on both these topics were collected in response to the proposed 
Deeming Rule. Id. Importantly, in the final Deeming Rule, the FDA intended to “use its 
enforcement discretion to take newly-deemed products with any flavor other than tobacco off the 
market – including menthol,” while allowing other newly-deemed products to stay on the market 
pending review of their premarket applications. Desmond Jenson & Joelle Lester, FDA Overruled 
by White House on Removing Flavored Cigars and E-Cigarette Liquids from the Market, PUB. 
HEALTH L. CTR. (June 2, 2016), http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/blogs/2016-06-02/fda-over 
ruled-white-house-removing-flavored-cigars-and-e-cigarette-liquids-market. However, the FDA 
was overruled by the White House’s Office of Management and Budget, which edited the Deeming 
Rule and “deleted 17 pages of evidence presented by the FDA supporting the need for immediate 
regulation of flavors in e-cigarettes and other tobacco products.” Micah L. Berman & Y. Tony 
Yang, E-Cigarettes, Youth, and the US Food and Drug Administration’s “Deeming” Regulation, 
170 J. AM. MED. ASS’N PEDIATRICS 1039, 1040 (2016). 
 86. See AAFP to House: Don’t Exempt Cigars from FDA Oversight, AM. ACAD. FAM. 
PHYSICIANS (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.aafp.org/news/health-of-the-public/20170223houseci 
garltr.html (discussing congressional efforts to exempt premium cigars from FDA regulation). 
 87. Press Release, Scott Gottlieb, supra note 79. 
 88. FDA’s Comprehensive Plan for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation, supra note 72. 
 89. FDA, MODIFICATIONS TO COMPLIANCE POLICY FOR CERTAIN DEEMED TOBACCO 
PRODUCTS: DRAFT GUIDANCE 14 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/media/121384/download. 
 90. Sheila Kaplan & Jan Hoffman, F.D.A. Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, Who Fought Teenage 
Vaping, Resigns, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/05/health/scott-
gottlieb-resigns-fda.html. 
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The challenges in implementing a nicotine reduction rule, however, go far 
beyond the question of who the commissioner is. For one, a rule to reduce 
nicotine levels in cigarettes must traverse a long road before it becomes a final 
regulation. In the medial products context, a 2014 review found that the average 
time for the FDA to finalize a significant rule was 7.3 years.91 And the long road 
to a final regulation makes numerous stops at the White House Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), which has been quite hostile toward tobacco 
regulation (including during the Obama administration). Further, under the 
Trump administration, OMB is implementing measures like the “2-for-1 rule” 
and “regulatory budgets” that have significantly reduced the pace of federal 
administrative rulemaking across the board.92 
The FDA has moved forward with issuing an ANPRM on nicotine 
reduction, but an ANPRM is still a long way from a final rule. Indeed, the FDA 
Center for Tobacco Products has a poor track record of converting ANPRMs 
into final rules.93 The likelihood that a nicotine rule will be finalized during the 
current presidential term is close to zero; the likelihood that it could be finalized 
during a potential second Trump administration term is also extremely low. Plus, 
at the end of the process, there is likely to be a lawsuit that could delay the 
implementation of a final rule even further.94  
Moreover, the tobacco industry—despite its rhetoric of wanting a “smoke-
free future”—will not accept a nicotine reduction regulation without a fight and 
will certainly try to slow down the FDA’s progress as much as possible.95 
Already, the major tobacco companies have been reassuring investors that a 
nicotine rule is not coming anytime soon. Altria General Counsel Murray 
Garnick told investors that the FDA’s plan kicks off “a long-term process with 
multiple opportunities for stakeholders to provide perspective,” and he 
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 92. Roncevert Almond et al., Regulatory Reform in the Trump Era: The First 100 Days, 35 
YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 29, 30, 46 (2017); CONNOR RASO, WHERE AND WHY HAS AGENCY 
RULEMAKING DECLINED UNDER TRUMP? (Brookings Inst. eds., 2018). 
 93. See Eric N. Lindblom, Should FDA Try to Move Smokers to E-Cigarettes and Other Less-
Harmful Tobacco Products and, if so, How, 73 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 276, 294 (2018). 
 94. There is also likely to be a delay between the time that a rule is finalized (or finally upheld 
in court) and the date it goes into effect. The TCA provides that a product standard cannot take 
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Could be Blowing Smoke with Plan to Cut Nicotine in Cigarettes, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), 
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foreshadowed several potential lines of legal attack against a final rule.96 
Likewise, Reynolds American emphasized to investors that the FDA rulemaking 
process is a “multi-year” undertaking and that the company is “well prepared 
and will be actively engaged” in the process.97 Besides lobbying the FDA and 
appealing to the courts, the industry also has other levels to pull. If the FDA does 
proceed in moving quickly towards a final rule reducing nicotine levels in 
cigarettes, the industry could seek to use its influence with Congress, the OMB, 
and the White House to prevent such a rule from being finalized (and, 
potentially, to revoke the FDA’s authority to issue such a product standard).  
Thus, despite its massive public health potential, it is unlikely that a nicotine 
reduction rule is coming anytime soon. In the meantime, though, the FDA’s 
decision to delay the review of newly-deemed products took effect immediately. 
As noted above, the argument that this delay “encourage[s] innovation” does not 
hold up to scrutiny, as it only applies to products that were already on the market 
when the Deeming Rule was finalized.98 Instead, e-cigarette companies were left 
with virtually free reign to continue promoting and selling their products in a 
largely unregulated environment that the FDA had previously referred to as the 
“wild, wild west.”99 The result has been an unprecedented surge in youth e-
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 97. Danny Herko, Exec. Vice President of Scientific & Regulatory Affairs, RAI Servs. Co., 
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regulatory approval”). 
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(quoting Mitch Zeller, the Director of the FDA’s Center for Tobacco Products). The FDA might 
disagree that these companies still operate in the “wild west,” but the FDA’s enforcement actions 
have been almost entirely limited to policing illegal sales to minors. With limited exceptions, it has 
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cigarette use, driven by the explosive popularity of JUUL100—a development 
the FDA is now belatedly scrambling to address.101 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This largely pessimistic review of tobacco regulation under the TCA is not 
meant to question the efforts or intentions of those leading the FDA Center for 
Tobacco Products (CTP). Rather, it is to suggest that the optimistic vision that 
FDA regulation would “fundamentally change how tobacco products are 
manufactured, marketed and sold in the United States”102 was perhaps 
unrealistic (or at least unlikely) from the start. Even if its leadership wanted to 
push forward with a powerful tobacco control measure (prohibiting the sale of 
menthol cigarettes, for example), the structural challenges facing CTP are 
immense. A more rigorous analysis of those barriers is needed, but some of them 
can be briefly cataloged here.  
As an initial matter, CTP is the newest of the FDA’s six centers and must 
compete with the interests of other centers when the FDA sets its priorities. 
Regulation of drugs and medical devices tends to dominate the FDA’s agenda, 
with former commissioner Gottlieb’s personal interest and involvement in 
tobacco regulation being the exception rather than the rule. The FDA is in turn 
just one agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
and so it must then compete with the other priorities of the Department. During 
the Obama administration, for example, HHS leadership was understandably 
preoccupied with implementing and defending the Affordable Care Act. And, 
for high-level decisions that require White House involvement, HHS is just one 
of the many cabinet agencies. Thus, what may look to the outside like wheel-
spinning may reflect the difficulties inherent in pushing aggressive policy 
measures through so many levels of review.  
Moreover, the rulemaking process provides many opportunities for public 
health initiatives to get derailed. In addition to lengthy and complex internal 
FDA processes and the well-established pathologies of the notice-and-comment 
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process,103 proposed rules must make repeated trips to OMB, where the tobacco 
industry can lobby for them to be delayed, weakened, or killed.104 Members of 
Congress can also weigh in, threatening to take retaliatory action against the 
FDA if it proceeds. Indeed, the mere mention that the FDA was open to a 
prohibition on menthol cigarettes provoked a strong response from the two 
senators from North Carolina (the home state of R.J. Reynolds).105 And all of 
these structural obstacles are without reference to the dynamics of the current 
administration, which has put policies in place that are designed to make it 
extremely difficult for any regulatory agency to issue new regulations.  
Should the FDA nonetheless somehow succeed in finalizing a regulation 
that threatens the industry’s interests, tobacco manufacturers, retailers, or trade 
associations will be standing by ready to litigate. And federal courts, as a general 
matter, are becoming less deferential towards regulatory agencies106 and more 
receptive to the First Amendment claims of corporations.107 In short, the TCA 
set up tobacco regulation to play out in arenas—the FDA, OMB, courts, and 
Congress—that tend to be challenging turf for public health groups to navigate. 
Evaluating the impact of FDA tobacco regulation overall is complicated by 
the fact that it is impossible to say what would have happened in the absence of 
such regulation. Perhaps the mere fact of FDA tobacco regulation has thwarted 
some negative developments that might otherwise have occurred. But if public 
health advocates are relying on the FDA to proactively lead the way forward, 
they are likely to be disappointed. In the U.S., tobacco control has historically 
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been more innovative and effective at more local levels, where the tobacco 
industry tends to have less power and influence.108 Despite the broad authority 
that the FDA now has, policymaking at the state and local levels is still likely to 
be the most effective pathway forward.  
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